In earlier publications, we had argued that Paul Ramsey is inconsistent because he simultaneously asserts that (i) 'all our days andyears are ofequal worth' and (ii) ' (4).
Not accepting defeat easily, Long once again put pen to paper (5) . He charges us with failing to see that what we regard as a contradiction can be explained in terms of Ramsey's metaphysical starting point. For Ramsey, Long suggests, life is a gift from God:'This means that the irreversible ebbing away of this gift (dying) has a religious significance' (6). It is, in Ramsey's words, 'a sign that God is calling his servant home'. Hence, when a Tay-Sachs infant 'has entered upon the process of dying', then 'only caring' attention is proper (7) . This is so, Long suggests, 'because the attempt to prolong the infant's life would be an impious intrusion into a process that is essentially sacred: it would be to exhibit hubristic deafness to God's call' (6).
On this interpretation of Ramsey's views, there is, according to Long, no Karen Ann Quinlan was permanently comatose. She could be kept alive indefinitely with the help of a respirator. If the respirator were turned off, it was believed she would die 'in a matter of minutes' (9) . In a case such as this, Paul Ramsey thought it permissible to discontinue life-sustaining treatment because 'treatments that were potentially life-saving (or reasonably believed to be so) when first begun have now become means of aimlessly prolonging Karen's dying'. Whilst such treatments can keep a patient alive, they 'will affect the still living patient's condition in no significant respect except to prolong dying' (10) .
In arguing for the permissibility of allowing Karen Ann Quinlan to die, Ramsey thus relies on the distinction between dying and non-dying patients. Karen is assigned to the category of the dying. But why should this be so? Permanently comatose patients can live for many years (as Karen Ann Quinlan did), and many patients whose medical condition is not significantly affected by treatment (polio victims supported by iron lungs, diabetics supported by insulin) are nonetheless not considered to be dying. Hence, to decide to allow a permanently comatose patient to die (whilst keeping those other patients alive), would seem to be a judgement based not on any distinction between dying and non-dying patients, but rather on a distinction between the different and lower value accorded to permanently comatose life (11) .
The case of Karen Ann Quinlan illustrates quite clearly, we think, the inconsistency in Ramsey's view. The same point could be made by focusing on Ramsey's example of infants suffering from incurable Tay-Sachs disease. In Tay-Sachs disease an infant appears normal for the first six months of its life and enjoys life as much as any other six-month-old baby would. But, Tay-Sachs babies are, in Ramsey's words, 'born destined to die'. Some time after six months, a process of irreversible degeneration sets in, and from some point in the dying process, treatment that 'can do no more than prolong dying' should, according to Ramsey, not be given and the infant should be allowed to die (12 
